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The BioSafety Protocol and International Trade in  
Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
The issue of appropriate rules for the regulation of trade in genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) has become the focal point of an often heated debate.  The wrangling over 
trade rules is part of the larger international debate raging over the regulation, and even the 
desirability of, commercial applications of genetic manipulation.  Biotechnology represents a 
significant technological change, which along  with having the potential to provide 
considerable benefits, also raises questions and creates uncertainties.  For those investing in 
the development of biotechnology, trade is a crucial issue.  The rate of technological advance 
in biotechnology is likely t o be very rapid meaning that the commercial life of any new 
genetic modification is likely to be short.  This means that access to potential markets may be 
a critical determinant of profitability.  Environmentalists and those with strong preferences 
regarding the quality of their food have tended to focus on the uncertainties surrounding 
GMOs and have lobbied for a go slow approach to their release into the market.  From their 
perspective, imports represent a potential source of undesirable products. 
 
Governments have been caught on the horns of a dilemma – they realise the potential 
benefits of the new technology but also feel they must address the concerns of those who are 
advocating caution.  The outcome of this dilemma has been that governments in different 
countries have taken a variety of approaches to domestic licensing depending on the relative 
weights given to the potential benefits and costs by policy makers.  Hence, access to some 
markets may be delayed or denied altogether.  These differences in d omestic regulatory 
regimes for GMOs can inhibit international trade.  The existing international trade institutions 
were not designed with the particular circumstances of the biotechnological revolution in 
mind.  As a result, the question of appropriate rules of trade in GMOs has arisen. 
 
In addition to the direct protagonists in the biotechnology debate, there are a large 
number of parties who have a considerable stake in the rules of trade, which will govern 
GMOs.  Farmers face uncertainty regarding the a dvisability of planting GMOs.  Food 
handling and processing firms may be faced with making significant investments in identity 
preservation systems.  Governments in developing countries may have to seek technical 
assistance to ensure continued market access for their products.  Food inspection agencies will 
have to budget for equipment and staff training.  Consumers wishing to make informed 
choices will have to spend time and effort to acquire the information they need.  Hence, 
increasing the transparency o f the rules of trade should be a priority for governments.  
Unfortunately, the BioSafety Protocol (BSP) recently signed in Montreal only serves to 
further muddy the waters. 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the international institution that has the 
primary responsibility for establishing rules for trade in goods and services and the 
international protection of intellectual property rights.  Its focus is protecting firms that wish 
to invest in international commercial endeavours from the capricious use of trade barriers by 
government.  While the WTO has a Committee on Trade and the Environment, it has 
consistently maintained that it does not have the expertise to make policy regarding the 
environment, suggesting instead that the proper policy forum is M ultinational Environmental CATRN Paper 2000-03     http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn 
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Agreements (MEAs).  A number of MEAs include provisions for the imposition of trade 
measures.  The Committee on Trade and Environment, however, has not yet been able to 
clarify the relationship between the WTO and MEAs and, in particular, which organisation’s 
rules should take precedent when trade provisions of MEAs conflict with those of the WTO 
(Kerr, 2000).  A related unresolved issue is which rules apply when the WTO and a particular 
MEA do not have totally overlapping memberships.       
             
The BioSafety Protocol is a MEA that is charged with devising a comprehensive 
international regulatory approach to the protection of biodiversity. The Cartagena Protocol, 
concluded in negotiations in Montreal on January 29, 2000, e stablishes rules to manage the 
environmental risks of transboundary movements of genetically modified living organisms.  
Although  the BSP has an environmental orientation, it also has provisions that have 
significant potential implications for trade in GMOs.  The preamble to the protocol 
acknowledges this and emphasizes that it  shall not be interpreted as changing the rights and 
obligations of countries under other international pacts, such as the WTO.  
 
Traditionally, environmental protection has been a predominantly domestic policy 
issue. The WTO maintains the divide between domestic and trade policies through the rigid 
application of four principles: (1) the focus on products and not production and processing 
methods (PPMs); (2) the national treatment provisions (e.g., GATT 1994, Article I which 
states that foreign products must be treated like domestic products); (3) the most-favoured 
nation principle (e.g. GATT 1994, Article III which states that all contracting parties must 
receive the same treatment domestically as the most-favoured nation receives domestically); 
and (4) the common exemption of environmental and natural resource issues under GATT 
1994, Article XX (general exemptions) (Phillips and Buckingham 2000).  However, 
agricultural biotechnology, w hich is centred around PPMs, makes it difficult to sustain this 
divide. This creates a fundamental challenge for the Biosafety Protocol as it attempts to 
balance environmental objectives and trade objectives.  
 
The Biosafety Protocol 
The BSP was negotiated between 1996 and 2000 by 138 countries under the auspices 
of the 1992 Convention on BioDiversity (CBD) of the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP).  The agreement, which must be ratified by at least 50 countries before it 
comes into force, provides rules for transboundary movements of GM organisms intended for 
environmental release and for those destined for the food chain. 
 
 For living GM organisms (e.g. seeds for propagation, seedlings, fish for release), 
exporters will be required to obtain approval from importing countries. Within 15 days of 
domestic regulatory approval having been granted for a new GM variety, a country would 
notify a Biosafety Clearing House with information about the traits and evaluations. The first 
time that a new GM variety is exported as seed, the exporting country would notify the 
importing country. The importing country would then decide whether to approve the shipment 
or decline the shipment because of risks identified through a science-based risk assessment. 
This process is called “advanced informed agreement” (AIA).  Although this seems 
straightforward, the Protocol includes two features that may be the source of conflicts in 
coming years.  First, the text indicates that countries may in their reviews of GMOs consider CATRN Paper 2000-03     http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn 
 
  3
socio-economic factors (e.g. the impact on local farmers), provided they respect their other 
international obligations. Second, the protocol includes the so-called  precautionary principle, 
whereby countries do not have to have complete scientific certainty  to block imports of a 
GMO that they fear could be harmful to biological diversity.  Although it is unclear how the 
negotiating parties expect the two exemptions to operate, it is likely, given the reference in the 
preamble to other international obligations, that any import bans that are not based on 
scientific risk assessments will be inconsistent with WTO obligations. As with the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) under the WTO, temporary 
bans may be permitted but it is likely that countries will need to make real efforts to undertake 
the science to validate (or refute) the concern.  
 
The framers of the Protocol have attempted to tightly focus it on environmental risks. 
To that end, transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms intended for food, 
feed and processing (e.g. commodities) will be exempt from the advanced informed 
agreement provisions. Nevertheless, exporters must label shipments with GM varieties as may 
contain GMOs and countries can decide whether to import those commodities based on a 
scientific risk assessment.  Furthermore, GMOs intended for  contained use (e.g. national 
breeding programs and research) and GMOs in transit through other countries will not require 
AIAs.  
 
Although the BSP is not explicitly intended to be a trade agreement, the fact that its 
scope includes export and import activities makes it an implicit or  de facto trade agreement 
associated with the international trade of genetically modified products. Successful 
completion of the Protocol has the potential to positively influence international trade in three 
significant ways.  First increased trade transparency according to the use of the AIA principle 
should remove friction in the market.  Second the scientific risk assessment procedures should 
increase trade fairness by ensuring that risks to biodiversity from genetically modified 
products, whether domestic or foreign, are assessed consistently using credible scientific risk 
assessment procedures.  Third, the Protocol should overcome the lack of domestic regulations 
in those countries with little or no experience with regulating genetically modified products 
(Mulongoy 1997). In this sense, the successful negotiation of the BSP can be interpreted as a 
potential win-win outcome. The global benefit, shared by all countries, is the overall 
conservation and protection of biodiversity. From an industry perspective, successful 
completion of the BSP has potential benefits for further research on and development, 
adoption and commercial use of genetically modified products because it would potentially 
increase predictability of market access. 
 
It is perhaps too early to confidently evaluate the protocol. In the first weeks after the 
agreement, almost all participants in the talks—developed and developing country 
governments, agricultural producers, biotechnology companies and public interest groups—
have expressed optimism that the protocol will protect the environment without unduly 
impeding international trade.  Representatives from the  Miami Group of countries—Canada, 
United States, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay—have applauded the agreement as 
providing sustained market access and protecting WTO rights and obligations.  The EU and 
the Third World Network point to the precautionary principle as a key innovation.  Producers 
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release.  Public interest groups are pleased with the precautionary principle and provisions for 
socio-economic factors being taken account of in the decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, the Protocol will not resolve all of the concerns in the marketplace. 
First, the US, which is the single largest producer of GM crops,  has not ratified the 1992 
CBD, which means that although it may  abide by the Protocol, it will not be a party to it. 
Second, most of the developing countries in the  world have little or no experience with 
domestic biosafety regulation and the Cartagena Protocol provides only limited protection 
against any adverse impact of agricultural biotechnology. The Protocol does not cover 
research and development, transfer, handling, testing, use and disposal of all GM products; 
those responsibilities will continue to fall on national governments. Third, the Protocol has 
not handled all of the socio-economic, ethical and consumer concerns as many hoped. Those 
concerns remain unanswered in any existing international agreement.  Finally, there are likely 
to be disputes that arise from the agreement but it is not clear from the information available 
how the Protocol will handle them. 
 
The economic and trade impact of the Protocol depends on how it is implemented. A 
recent study of the potential impact of the BSP (Isaac and Phillips, 1999) concluded that the 
trade impact for canola could be as small as 0.5% of total exports, equal to an estimated $6 
million annually (with the scope limited to first time shipments of GM organisms intended for 
deliberate release). This impact would rise if countries designate some commodity shipments 
as potential seed for release. As well, the impact could rise depending on how the mandatory 
labelling of commodity shipments influences market access.  It is possible that some countries 
may not reject shipments based on scientific assessments but there may be delays because of 
the large volume of new varieties to consider.  Isaac and Phillips (1999) suggest that as many 
as 408 new GM varieties of canola, involving 54 novel traits, could be introduced in Canada 
over the next seven years.  Combined with the flow of new traits in other crops, many 
countries with limited regulatory capacity may be swamped.  If segregated production and 
marketing systems are not possible, then all the production from a country must be considered 
as GM if approval for the unconfined  production of even one GM variety has been granted.  
In the short-term, participants in the Canadian grains and oilseeds industry insist that the 
present Canadian distribution system makes it 100% logistically and economically impossible 
to segregate GM product from non-GM product (Hart, Vincent and Bubber, 1997, Phillips 
and Smyth, 1999), a view shared by both US and European industry participants. The few 
systems that were tried in Canada cost an estimated $33-41/tonne in incremental handling 
costs (Manitoba Pool Elevators, 1997). More recently, a number of US grain merchants have 
introduced producer contracts for GM-free deliveries but it is not clear yet whether there are 
premiums in consumer markets to pay for the incremental costs. This could effectively 
impede international market access for biotechnology products. 
 
The BSP’s trade provisions and the WTO 
As suggested above, four aspects of the BSP’s trade provisions directly conflict with 
WTO principles and practices: (1) trade barriers justified on the basis of production and 
processing methods; (2) the inclusion of the  precautionary principle as decision criteria for 
the imposition of import bans; (3) allowing socio-economic factors to be considered in the 
approval process for imports and; (4) mandatory labelling of commodities not destined for CATRN Paper 2000-03     http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn 
 
  5
agronomic production which potentially contain GMOs.  The latter seems oddly placed in a 
protocol that is supposed to be narrowly focussed on protecting biodiversity.  It can be 
interpreted as an attempt by those opposed to biotechnology to obtain the ability to inhibit 
international trade in GMOs through the back door when they have been unsuccessful in 
obtaining it at the WTO.  The potential for conflict with WTO conventions makes it 
imperative that the question of which organisation take precedent over the other be decided 
quickly (Hobbs, 2000). 
 
The WTO does not allow trade barriers to be put in place on the basis of PPMs.  Only 
product characteristics can be used.  It has been long recognized that allowing the use of trade 
barriers on the basis of PPMs would provide a wide open door for protectionist interests.  If, 
for example, cotton cloth could be excluded from a market because it was produced on hand 
looms rather than modern machinery, then it would be easy for vested interests in countries 
using modern machinery to lobby for protection against (cheap) cotton produced on hand 
looms.  As long as the cotton cloth from both processes is similar (does not have different 
product characteristics) then the WTO rules do not allow countries to impose trade barriers.  
When the subject of allowing trade restrictions on the basis of PPMs has been brought up in 
the context of GMOs at the WTO, developing countries, in particular, have objected 
strenuously seeing it as the  thin edge of the wedge.  Developing countries feel that they did 
not receive the benefits pertaining to textiles and clothing that they expected from the 
Uruguay Round and are pressing hard for further liberalization.  Hence, they are extremely 
sensitive  to any rule changes that could be used to thwart their attainment of increased market 
access in developed countries.  Given the difficulties developing countries are likely to have 
in regulating domestic use of GMOs, they will perceive that the PPM provisions of the BSP 
are simply a form of disguised protectionism put in place to deny market access in developed 
countries for their agricultural products.  They can be expected to seek recourse in WTO 
rules.  Clearly, the WTO rules were not put in place with the unique problems associated with 
a technological advance such as genetic engineering in mind. 
 
It may seem that the insertion of genetic material through biotechnology represents a 
product characteristic as well as a PPM and, hence, can be handled by the existing WTO 
rules.  Unfortunately, the question is not so simple.  Most of the genetically modified products 
in commercial production are based on improving agronomic performance such as resistance 
to herbicides or insects.  For the consumer, there is no visible difference between a potato 
whose plant has been genetically altered to resist pests and one which is derived from a plant, 
which has not been altered.  This absence of difference has been part of the basis for domestic 
approval of genetically modified foods in some countries such as Canada. 
 
Even if one is willing to accept that agronomic enhancing modifications are additions 
to product characteristics, other problems remain with the BSPs inclusion of PPM as a criteria 
for restricting trade.  The  BSP makes no distinction between transgenic and non-transgenic 
applications of genetic engineering.  Transgenic modifications (e.g. insertion of a fish gene 
into a tomato) do add new material from different biological organisms and, hence, could be 
considered a new product characteristic under the WTO. Non-transgenic modifications simply 
select genetic material from the same species.  It allows improvements to crops such as wheat 
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breeding.  Genetic engineering is a process and, hence, falls under the BSP definition but it is 
hard to argue that non-transgenic use of the process adds a characteristic to the product.  It 
was there naturally.  Hence, there would appear to  be a conflict between the WTO and the 
BSP. 
Further, in the case of processed foods, the refining processes often remove all traces 
of the genetically modified organisms from the product (e.g. processed canola oil does not 
have any detectable proteins and h ence does not have any transgenic materials).  Thus, there 
would be no change in the characteristics of the product exported.  No trade restrictions could 
be justified under the WTO but as the process was used in the initial production of the crop 
they could be justified under the BSP. 
 
The precautionary principle is a central demand of many environmental NGOs.  It has 
been incorporated into the European Union’s (EU) environmental policy and its regulatory 
regime for GMOs (Perdikis, 2000).  The EU has also  suggested that the  precautionary 
principle be incorporated into the SPS.  This was, in part, a direct result of the beef hormone 
case and is viewed as a purely protectionist ploy by the US and Canada who had brought the 
case to the WTO (Roberts, 1998).  The EU also wished to have it incorporated into the SPS to 
help it deal with consumer and environmentalist resistance to GMOs (Kerr, 1999a).  As yet, 
they have not succeeded in having the SPS re-opened for negotiation. 
 
The current SPS rules only allow trade barriers to be imposed for health, sanitary or 
phytosanitary reasons if there is a scientific justification for keeping the products out of the 
market and if a risk assessment has been completed.  This scientific-based decision process 
was put in place to prevent protection being extended to domestic producers through abuse of 
technical regulations.  There is an implicit assumption that there will be sufficient information 
available to make a scientific determination and to undertake a risk assessment.   
 
Unfortunately, in the case of GMOs there is not sufficient information to do either for 
long term human health (Kerr, 1999a).  It is a situation of uncertainty.  It should be noted that 
the SPS does not address issues pertaining to environmental safety.  T he SPS does allow for 
situations where there is insufficient information to make a scientific determination.  As 
suggested above, the country which justifies the imposition of a trade barrier on these grounds 
can only do so temporarily and must be taking a ctive measures to secure sufficient scientific 
information.  The entire approach to trade barriers at the SPS is Why?  The approach under 
the  precautionary principle is  Why Not? (Perdikis, 2000).  Thus, there is a fundamental 
difference in the WTO approach to trade restrictions and those built into the BSP. 
 
The major problem with the  precautionary principle is with its implementation (Kerr, 
2000).  It is a principle  – not a decision making process.  Hence, while a principle can be 
refined  – to put some boundaries around the decision process – it cannot provide a decision 
making rule.  The EU, having accepted the  precautionary principle in its environmental 
policy at the behest of environmental NGOs and the Green Party is now wrestling with the 
problem of how decisions should be made in its name (see for example Commission of the 
European Communities, 2000).  The Commission document concludes ultimately that 
decisions under the precautionary principle will be political decisions. 
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To see the difficulties associated with decision making under the precautionary 
principle, it is informative to read carefully the discussion by Streinz (1998): 
 
Whereas this [precautionary] principle is recognized “in principle” at least in 
some branches, especially environmental law, it is difficult to fix the concrete 
emanations, the application of the principle in practice.  The reason for this is 
that the precautionary principle should be applied explicitly in situations of 
recognized uncertainty, when a risk assessment has been made, but could by 
the limits of scientific recognition not lead to a clearly science-based decision, 
whereas serious risks which cannot be excluded need preventative ie 
“cautious” action.  To determine the situations which justify the application of 
the precautionary principle, and, if decided to do so, to determine the extent of 
“caution” are political decisions, even if they may be partly based on scientific 
evidence. In this context it must be emphasized that the reference on “science” 
is not necessarily a reference to objective data and presumptions (p. 421). 
 
There are no answers as to how much science is enough, what costs (to human health 
or the environment) are acceptable, when uncertainty no longer exists, etc.  With an absence 
of transparency over these issues, the question arises as to what will be the basis of political 
decisions.  Even more important, can the political decision making process be influenced by 
other interests.  Again Streinz (1998) is instructive: 
 
It [the precautionary principle] can be shaped to support any cause, when 
protagonists are arguing about the future, which does not exist except in their 
imaginations (p. 421). 
 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that an organisation such as the WTO, 
which was established t o protect those wishing to engage in international transactions from 
the capriciousness of politicians, is antipathetic to a principle that takes a Why Not approach 
to the imposition of trade barriers. 
 
  Changes in the international economy affect the relative competitiveness of firms.  
Competition from imports from countries whose relative competitiveness has improved will 
be detrimental to producers of import competing products in countries whose relative 
competitiveness has deteriorated.  As a result, profits will be eroded and adjustment costs 
imposed on factors of production such as labour (Leger, et al, 1999).  Those negatively 
impacted often ask politicians to extend them protection in the form of trade barriers.  Of 
course, if this protection is put in place the gains expected from trade will be negated.  While 
the WTO allows countries to retain protection extended in the past (while encouraging them 
to negotiate reductions), it puts strict limits on the conditions when new protectionist 
measures can  be put in place for these reasons.  Protection against competitive imports can 
only be extended temporarily under anti-surge measures.  The BSPs provisions relating to 
taking account of  socio-economic factors in the regulation of imports is in direct conflict with 
a central tenet of the WTO.  Again it seems a strange addition to a Protocol which is 
concerned with ensuring biodiversity.  There seems little connection between the two and one CATRN Paper 2000-03     http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn 
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is left wondering if this is, again, an attempt to obtain protection on this account through the 
back door when it could not be obtained though the WTO. 
 
  Finally, the mandatory labelling of genetically modified products not destined for 
agronomic production  – for food, feed or processing  – may be in conflict with the WTO.  
There are two agreements which cover labelling at the WTO – the SPS and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  The SPS takes precedent over the TBT if the product is to 
be labelled for health reasons.  If a product is to be labelled for health reasons then the 
labelling must have a scientific basis and a risk assessment must be undertaken.  While the 
BSP mandates a risk assessment, it is not clear what part the precautionary principle will play 
in the risk assessment process.  Further, what  should a BSP risk assessment for purposes of 
labelling entail?  The CBD, within which the BSP falls, deals with biodiversity not human 
health.  Hence, do the scientific justification and risk assessment associated with BSP 
mandated labelling of genetically modified products entail only biodiversity concerns? 
 
  If no health risk is claimed, the TBT allow labelling for the purposes of consumer 
information.  The criteria for imposition is that the costs associated with technical barriers 
should not exceed the  benefits received by consumers from the imposition of the barriers.  
The reason often given for labelling genetically modified products (although not explicitly 
discussed in the BSP) is presumably to provide consumers with the ability to chose not to buy 
genetically modified products (Hobbs, 2000). 
 
  The BSP mandates a  may contain label.  While there may be some initial loss of 
market as consumers exercise their preferences for non-genetically modified products, the 
cost of labelling for firms producing genetically modified products should be quite low.  This 
is because consumers do not care if genetically modified products are tainted by those which 
are not genetically modified.  On the other hand, consumers will care if a product that claims 
it is not genetically modified is contaminated by those which are genetically modified.  This 
means that those wishing to sell products which do not show the  may contain genetically 
modified organisms label must put mechanisms in place to make their claims (or maybe in 
this case their absence of a claim) credible.  This involves very costly identity preservation 
mechanisms all along the supply chain from input suppliers and farmers to retailers.  This will 
put those wishing to sell products which have not been genetically modified at a considerable 
commercial disadvantage (Kerr, 1999b).  If those costs are sufficiently high, then food 
processors may simply label all their products  may contain genetically modified organisms 
and, ironically consumer choice may no longer exist (Hobbs, 2000). 
 
Conclusions 
  While it is not clear how the WTO would treat the issue of costs associated with not 
labelling (i.e. that not labelling a product with  may contain genetically modified organisms 
will entail proving that they do not) there is a clear TBT question of costs versus benefits to 
consumers as a result of the BSP regulations.  None of this seems to have been considered by 
the framers of the BSP. 
 
  While the BSP may be reasonably well designed to deal with issues related to trade in 
GMOs that will enter agronomic or aquaculture production, they seem poorly designed for CATRN Paper 2000-03     http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn 
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regulating trade in genetically modified products. While the biodiversity mandate of the BSP 
makes it the appropriate forum for the regulation of the former, it is not e ven clear that is 
should have jurisdiction over the latter.  Regulations in these areas would appear to relate 
primarily to trade in goods and food safety which has traditionally been within the mandate of 
the WTO.  The BSP is clearly inconsistent with the WTO in a number of areas.  While it is a 
well-established principle that a country can voluntarily give up its recourse to WTO 
disciplines, one suspects that this will not always be the case for the issue of trade in 
genetically modified products.  Hence, it is imperative that jurisdictional issues should be 
sorted out quickly because there are many interested parties that have a large stake in the 
outcome. 
 
  It would seem prudent for countries that have an interest in exporting agricultural 
products that  have been genetically modified to withhold ratification of the BSP until the 
currently  muddied waters are clarified.  Of course, nothing precludes a country voluntarily 
complying with aspects of the BSP which it does accept (e.g. AIA) without having to ratify 
the Protocol.   
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